Alternative Panpsychism

The topos of this article is ontology.  The attempt here in is a journey of discovery into the nature of reality, while avoiding the limitations of substance dualism, monist reductionism, phenomenological ontology (Heidegger), and self-satisfying illusion of objectivity.  The goal is take an element or two from all of these and to forge a new theory of being.  To understand the nature of being beyond the subjective knowledge as itself.  Rest assured that I don’t intend to suggest answers, but merely to refine the question.  I am dissatisfied with Kant’s abandonment of the question entirely.  I believe the numena can be known in and of itself and in fact is known by each and every one of is.  And that is as good a place as any to start.

Kant’s view that things in and of themselves can’t be known suffers the fatal flaw that it presumes “things” to be something other than the self.  What Kant really means to say is that Other things can’t be know in and of themselves.  One might go so far as to suggest that this is the metaphysical root of the Self/Other divide.  But for our purposes in this essay, Kant really can’t say that the experiencer is unknowing of its own experience.  For proof, I might offer Descartes, whose Cogito argument unquestionably suggests that the experiencer knows they are experiencing.  The thinker knows they are thinking, even if they know not what they are thinking.  To be able to deduce one’s existence from the fact that one experiences, regardless of whether or not that experience is a delusion, requires a silent premise that one has some experience of experiencing.  For if one is not aware that one is aware, the Cogito becomes unconvincing.

So, if we agree with Descartes that we do indeed have an sense of our experiencing, then we must also have an experience of experiencing.  There is little radical in this so far, but one implication of this is that we must have an experience of ourselves, that is of our experiences as from a thing, a place of being, an existence.  Thus, we know what it is like to exist as ourselves.  Assuming then, perhaps contra Kant, that we too are things, then we have the experience of one thing in and of itself, namely ourselves.

That doesn’t seem to get us very far, and if it does anything it all it seems to lock us into a phenomenology of everything that is Other to our subjectivity.  But I don’t think that sort of absolutist abandon is quite right.  I grant that our direct knowledge of Other things is filtered through our phenomenological experiences in a wholly subjective manner.  However, it is not by direct observation alone that we come to know the world around us, and reasonable deductions of the invisible can nevertheless become knowledge.  So, armed with the knowledge of numena as ourselves, and our knowledge of others as we phenomenologically perceive them, what, if anything, can we know?

Let’s make one simple assumption.  That there is nothing special or different about an atom that is a constituent of ourselves and those that are not ourselves.  To make this more concrete, I’m simply claiming that a sodium atom in table salt is not essentially different from a sodium atom in neuron of your brain, in fact the former may be ingested by you for the sole purpose of becoming one of the latter.  If you’ll grant me this consistency of the elemental universe, then it is reasonable to assume that my experiences of being a solution of atoms is a trait of atoms.  The experience of the sodium atoms in your brain is not wholly different from that of the sodium atom in the table salt and that your experience of the world is then at least similar to the experience of the whole world, all its things, organic or inorganic.

Now, that certainly sounds absurd.  Of course my experiences are different from those of table salt, is what you’re probably thinking.  But you’re wrong on a fundamental level.  And yet, you’re right on a level of higher complexity.  The danger here is one of equivocation regarding the word “experience”.  So, let’s clear that up.  When I say your experience of yourself is the same as the experience of the table salt, I do not mean to suggest that the table salt has conscious and phenomenal experiences like you do.  What I do mean is that it experiences things that happen in the universe.  Salt dropped in water has an experience of dissolution.  Much like you dropped in water have an experience of floating.  Perhaps a better example would be a rock dropped from a height toward the Earth experiences gravity in a nearly identical way you would experience gravity in the same situation.  The experience I mean here is that of interaction with the other things and forces of the universe.

Before you get all disappointed with the essay and say, well so what?  Everyone knows that things can have forces applied to them, but what we really want to know is if they have conscious and phenomenological experiences like us, and if not, then why do we?  Good question, let me attempt to answer it by saying that while all matter experiences the things that happen to it, only complex organic matter remembers those experiences for any amount of time longer than the experience takes to occur.  Memory is what makes our experiences stick.  Experiences can be recalled, set against one another, compared and synthesized.  This is consciousness.  This is phenomenal experience.  A phenomena is more than photons hitting the atoms in the rods and cones of your retina, which is simply an experience.   Phenomenal experience requires a secondary process, one that is complex and involves memory, pattern recognition, and ultimately gives rise to the experience of what we call consciousness.

Let me be clear, I’m not suggesting any kind of reductionist physical explanation for consciousness.  It’s not that we have more complex structures that give rise to things like biology and psychology, but that that these structures can repeat experiences.  The sodium atoms in our brain and those in the table salt both experience the world, but the physical and chemical structure of our brains allow us to repeat our experiences again (remembering) and to mimic them without the stimuli reoccurring (recalling).  I am not suggesting any sort of determinism.  The atoms themselves function with quantum mechanical indeterminacies the likes of which make any reductionist determinism a dubious prospect at best.  I am instead saying that consciousness and phenomenal experience can be understood through a monist material worldview.

So to summarize here, conscious experience is a result of phenomenological experience, which itself is a result of physical experience.  The last is shared by all matter, living or not.  Thus, consciousness is understandable in a monist materialistic picture of the universe, without the need for substance dualism, and limited by neither phenomenology, subjectivism, naive objectivity, or hampered by a reductionist regress into determinism.  All matter experiences, but only living things re-experience.   Thus only living things remember, recall, and know that they have experienced anything other than what they are experiencing now.

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The Genius and Folly of Karl Marx

In this paper, I invite my reader to assume a particular view of Karl Marx and his theories.  In this view, we see Marx as a physician, treating an ailing society.  Through our examination of his work, we will conclude that his diagnosis is keen; in fact keener than any before or since.  However, his actual understanding of the disease is very limited, and his methods of treatment, where they exist, sadly misguided.  I don’t want to condemn him for efforts, but nevertheless, his theoretical faults are real and dire.

We will proceed by summarizing Marx’s general position on the exploitation of labor by capital and his explanation of it by means of his positive economic theory.  Our analysis will then focus precisely on the first chapter of the first volume of Capital, in which Marx attempts to render utility or use-value as a purely qualitative function of economic exchange.  I hope to show that Marx’s positive economic analysis is doomed because utility is not merely qualitative but quantifiable; in fact, it is quantifiable in units of labor-time.  With a reintroduction of use-value into the determination of an exchange-value, private property and markets for exchange become a necessary economic reality.  Finally, the paper will conclude that despite this error in Marx’s thinking, that capitalism is, in fact, exploitative of labor.   Thus, I will find that Marx’s conclusions ultimately prove correct, but not at all for the reasons he believed.

Part one:

It is not clear, to me anyway, whether Marx’s theory of exploitation came as a result of his positive economic theorizing or whether his positive economic theory was devised to explain his theory of exploitation.  What is clear is that Marx ultimately links the two in such a way that future scholars, both opponents and followers of Marx, have acted as though the theory of exploitation is contingent on Marx’s positive economics.  The need to sever the causal relationship here is paramount.  To begin then I’d like to describe both of these theories independently, that is without the implicit assumption that they are causally linked.

Marx’s theory of exploitation involves only the question of who has the right to the value of the fruit of human effort?  For Marx, the answer is the same as it was for John Locke, the laborers and the laborers alone have a right to the value of the fruit of their labor.  For Locke, this meant the ownership of the concrete object itself, but for Marx, it was abstracted to value the object represents.  Marx saw that value, in this abstract form could be siphoned off through legal economic practices and in this Marx recognized exploitation.  If the value of the manufactured object was solely produced by the laborer, then the laborer who was not being paid the full measure of value was being cheated.

How this value was created and how it was extracted needed to be explained and, if possible, proved.  This was the work of Marx’s positive economic theory.  His theory center’s around the labor theory of value.  Marx’s labor theory of value–like that of Ricardo’s–finds its roots in Locke, who wrote,

For ‘tis not [merely] the Plough-man’s Pains, the Reaper’s and Thresher’s Toil, and the Bakers Sweat, is to be counted into the Bread we eat; the Labour of those who broke the Oxen, who digged and wrought the Iron and Stones, who felled and framed the Timber imployed [sic] about the Plough, Mill, Oven, or any other Utensils, which are vast Number, requisite to this Corn, from its being seed to be sown to its being made Bread, must all be charged on the account of Labour, and received as an effect of that: Nature and the Earth furnished only the almost worthless Materials, as in themselves.

This idea of value as an account of labor, a tally of each hour spent in every pursuit minimally necessary for the creation of each useful thing produced by human industry is taken virtually unquestioned from Locke through to Marx.  For simplicity’s sake, I’ll call this labor accounted for in the creation of a thing or commodity the labor of acquisition, which I define as labor necessary to bring about a commodity and deliver it into the hands of those who would use it.  For Marx, the labor of acquisition is a sufficient cause for and the sole determinant of the full value of every commodity.  Marx is alone in this.  Locke, Ricardo, and other economists all believe that there is more to the determination of value than the labor of acquisition.  

The advantage of Marx’s theory is that value can be objectively and empirically calculated, prior to markets of distribution.  It is obvious that, if the value of any given thing was exactly equal to the minimum number of human labor hours necessary to bring about its possession then we can objectively measure the value of every particular thing by simply counting up all the hours.  But there has always been a disadvantage associated with Marx’s cut and dry labor theory and that is use-value.

Political economists have–since Adam Smith at least–separated the value associated with the utility of an object, e.g. driving nails for a hammer or digging for a shovel, from the value it is said to exchange for with another object.  The former being the object’s use-value and the latter its exchange-value.  Smith and others suspected a relationship must exist between the two; however, by the time Marx was writing no one had yet to successfully formulate a theory showing how the two values related.  If use-value is a factor in determining exchange-value, as was suspected, then the labor of acquisition is not sufficient to determine value.  In other words, the central component of Marx’s positive economic theory, i.e. his labor theory of value, would be necessarily false.  Where Marx to simply include use-values, he would have to reintroduce markets and establish private property as necessary economic conditions.  Rather than do that, Marx opted to find a way to show that use-values were not a factor in value determinations.  

Part two:

Marx begins the first volume of Capital with a discussion of the commodity-form–that is a useful thing made for the purpose of exchanging it–which he considered the basic unit of capitalism.  At the very beginning of his investigation into the political economy of capitalism, Marx writes that the usefulness or use-value of a commodity is “independent of the amount of labour required to appropriate its useful qualities,” and a few sentences later, “use-values are only realized in use or in consumption.”  Now Marx realized, commodities, in order to exchange for each other at all, must have some common property, but Marx meant to prove that the value we associate with use, plays no part in determinations of appropriation of a thing (which recall is measured in labor), aside from the fact that it must have some use to even be considered worthy of appropriation.  Thus, utility or use is not the common property of all commodities, according to him.  

Marx then draws a bright line between subjective use-values and labor, dismissing the former as the valueless “material bearers” of exchange-value.  Like Locke in the quotation above, Marx has determined the material part to be worthless except that it is necessary as a value-bearer.  This role as value-bearer is unquantifiable, and so plays no part in the tallying of exchange-value.  Marx holds that use-values “constitute the material content of wealth, whatever its social form may be”.  By this he means that use-value is merely qualitative and has no value measurable in units, be they labor or anything else; it is–in Marx’s estimation–a function of the socially-determined, material form of the object.  He expresses it again this way, “As use-values, commodities differ above all in quality, while as exchange-values they can only differ in quantity, and therefore do not contain an atom of use-value”.  He means that when we are evaluating commodities for the purpose of trade, their usefulness is not a factor in determining their value to us.  Hence, Marx suggests use-values can and should be dismissed:

If then we disregard the use-value of commodities, only one property remains, that of being products of labour.  But even the product of labour has already been transformed in our hands.  If we make abstraction from its use-value, we abstract also from the material constituents and forms which make it a use-value.  It is no longer a table, a house, a piece of yarn or any other useful thing.  All its sensuous characteristics are extinguished.  Nor is it any longer the product of the labour of the joiner, the mason or the spinner, or of any other particular kind of productive labour.  With the disappearance of the useful character of the products of labour, the useful character of the kinds of labour embodied in them also disappears; this in turn entails the disappearance of the different concrete forms of labour.  They can no longer be distinguished, but are all together reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract.

No one–as far as I know–questions Marx on this point.  Marx’s brilliance in finding a way to reduce value to the labor of acquisition, which is objectively and empirically accountable (at least in theory) is undermined by his inadvertently eliminating labor as a concept distinct from mere physical activity from his labor theory of value.  

To “disregard the use-value of commodities” is to assume that any random and purposeless physical action is labor.  Labor, however, is purposeful activity aimed at the creation of some particular object for which a use is intended.  Marx has abstracted use to being a property of a material thing, and in so doing he has missed use’s necessary relationship to laboring itself.  To be able to disregard use, Marx must claim that material things can have a use-value, without necessarily having a particular end (viz. use) associated with them by any human being.  That is to say that commodities may possess an abstract use, which requires no intention of any usage at all.  But such a thing is self-contradictory because it asserts that uses exist which do not require a user.  In other words, Marx is assuming here that although no human being has a use for a commodity, it may nevertheless possess an abstract utility (not a hypothetical one) which renders it a bearer of value as the product of labor.

Marx is entirely correct that use or use-value and the labor of acquisition are entirely distinct from each other, and that the latter is the concern of the producer while the former is the concern of the consumer.  He is also right to claim that in order to exchange at all, objects must share a common substance.  As we just saw Marx assumes that use has nothing to do with labor.  But it is consumption and thus use that drives the intention behind labor.  Without use, labor is indistinguishable from random physical activity.  It is through labor that we can see use’s relationship to value beginning to emerge.  Labor indeed is the common substance between all commodities, as Marx suspected, but labor itself is necessarily linked to use and so the use-value of commodities cannot be summarily disregarded without also disregarding labor from our theory of value.

To make this more concrete we might employ a simple reductio ad absurdum.  According to Marx’s theory, all value is equal only to the labor of acquisition.  Suppose now that you are tasked with digging a drainage ditch in your yard to protect your house from flooding.  Now rather than dig up the yard with your bare hands you seek a tool to assist in the excavation.  Now suppose that you find two digging objects that have the same labor that went into bringing them to you.  One is a large stainless steel cooking spoon and the other a steel-headed wooden-handled shovel.  Both of these commodities would be useful in digging up the yard, i.e. they would be better than using your hands, and both have the same labor of acquisition and so the same price at market.  According to Marx’s theory then they both have a use and so can bear value and the value to you the consumer should be perfectly equal.  Thus, since use-value is not a factor in determining value you should be just as likely to buy the spoon as to buy the shovel for digging the drainage ditch.  This obviously absurd.  The shovel is the better tool.  But to even say the better tool some quantitative measure of use must be employed.  If use can be quantitatively rendered, then use-values are not merely qualitative and simply the material form.  And if this is the case then use-values may, and probably do constitute a factor in determining value.

Part three:  

What is useful about an object is precisely that it saves labor toward some intended end and how much.  Marx’s divorce of the value of things–including things as commodities–from their material uses misses the obvious fact that to use a thing is synonymous with laboring with that thing and that laboring always has a use in mind.  Thus, labor can be found in both directions from one’s situational relationship to a particular commodity.  Just like every act of selling is an act of buying, so also is every act of valuing an act of appraisal of usage.  The use-value differs from the labor of acquisition in that it is future-oriented and evaluates upcoming labor expenditures in which the object might be some measure of assistance.  The labor of acquisition, as we well know, is past-oriented and evaluates the labor required to legally lay claim to the object that it may be used.  These two labor evaluations are both necessary to sufficiently yield a final value determination or exchange-value.  Value is recognized only in the combination of use-value and the labor of acquisition relative to the particular seller, buyer and the buyer’s task at hand.  

Locke showed that human beings need to come to possess a thing in order to use it (i.e. acquisition through labor), but they also require a reason to come to possess it in the first place (i.e. they need an intention to use that thing).  Also instructive here is Smith’s notion that labor itself carries both a utility and a disutility.  While I grant Marx that use is only possible when there are possession and possession requires a certain amount of labor expended to obtain an object, that labor is not the only labor with which we associate the value of a commodity.  The other labor involves the object’s deployment, i.e. it uses.  How many hours will it take you to dig the ditch with your bare hands?  How much less with the spoon?  How much less with the shovel?  If the shovel has less than the spoon and your hands it has a higher use-value.  This use-value is then set against the cost of the labor of acquisition.  If the shovel is so expensive, that it would require more hours of labor at another job for you to acquire it than it would take for you to dig the ditch with your bare hands, your interests would be best served by digging the ditch barehanded.  

The problem Marx hoped to solve with socialized abstract labor is that different physical labors are qualitatively different from each other, so that–for example–tailoring is different from weaving.  By abstraction, labor can be divested of its qualitative aspects leaving only its quantity, measured in labor hours.  Physical labor is different from the general pool of hours available to all human beings of the same relative abilities.  These temporal hours are all abstractly alike and so can be rendered merely quantitative, i.e. an hour of anyone’s labor-time is equal to an hour of everyone’s labor-time. 

And this is true as far as the labor of acquisition is concerned; for when the the buyer is confronted by the commodity, the particular skills, tools, and substances of its creation are all equalized in an abstract averaging.  There are exceptions, but those exceptions tend to fall on the side of use-value as opposed to the labor of acquisition.  Note however that this averaging is only true from the perspective of the buyer.  The seller rather sees the labor of acquisition as the lowest starting point of the object’s value, the minimum for which the commodity may be released; to the labor of acquisition, the seller always wishes to add the use-value of his would-be customer.  

Socialized abstract labor is an average in the mind of the buyer, and as such, it cannot be individuated although it is individually generated.  The effect is that socialized abstract labor appears as “one homogeneous mass of human labour-power”.  This mass can be divided among the “world of commodities”–supposedly providing their exchange-values–but it is not individuated because it has been averaged.  For example, if three workers produce use-values in x, y, and z quantities of physical labor-time, then their abstract labor would be the mean of x, y, and z.  It would be a statistical error to then reassert that each worker produced one-third of that average.  What can be asserted is that the commodities produced by the workers have a total labor of acquisition (from the point of view of the buyer) equal to the mean of x, y, and z.  

To understand the problem with this averaging, we need only return the fact that when divorced of the link to use and use-values, all of the “productive expenditures of human brains, muscles, nerves, hands, etc.” are not in fact labor.  What is deceptive in this quotation is Marx’s inclusion of the word “productive”, which attempts to sneak “use” back in where it was supposedly being disregarded.  To be productive is to produce something, and by the expenditure of human power.  With that broad definition, every action could be an act of socialized abstract human labor, including sleep which produces rest, or television-viewing which produces leisure.  This interpretation of “productive expenditures” renders every hour indistinguishable from every other hour of every person.  The only measure of socially necessary labor time, i.e. socialized abstract labor, would be the total amount of available hours for every conceivable human pursuit (viz. twenty-four a day) multiplied by the total number of human beings currently in existence.  Another absurdity! 

Surely Marx did not intend to reduce the meaning of “labor”–by socializing and abstracting it–to mere physical activity, any physical activity; instead, I imagine that he had some subset of physical activity that is purposeful.  To be purposeful is to have an end in mind, and that is the same as saying that there is some use to the activity in that it brings about some end.  Further, because this end is socialized, it cannot be just any end, but one that is socially defined (to be laborious).  Thus, not all “productive expenditures” that take human hours constitute labor; labor is only the hours of “productive expenditure” devoted to completing a socially-defined work task.  The “task” is necessary to distinguish labor from mere physical activity, which is to say that the qualitative aspect is what identifies the activity as labor.  When Marx abstracts it away, we can no longer tell what is and is not labor.  The “homogeneous mass of human labour-power” must include leisure hours as well as work hours.  Clearly if leisure can be considered labor then the capitalists are contributing their fair share of socialized abstract labor to society, by handling all of its socially necessary leisure time.  

Marx is sneaky with his words; the “socialized” in socialized abstract labor is meant to sneak “use” back in, for what could be socialized except the tasks labor is set to accomplish?  This is not to condemn abstract labor, but merely to show that such abstractions can only be quantified at the subjective, individual perspective.  To put it another way, I can count the number of hours it would take me to perform any kind of labor, because I–and I alone–know my relative abilities to complete a task.  My estimation would need to include my skills, my knowledges, and my relative physical situation, along with any and all tools at my disposal.  My present situation is vital.  Consider that an apple on the tree five miles from you takes longer to gather than one growing right in front of you.  The situation changes the labor of acquisition as well as use-value.  Thus, only I can estimate the abstract labor-time necessary to complete a task and that estimation applies only to myself.  These kinds of abstractions cannot be generalized, and so it is an error to socialize abstract labor as Marx has done.  A subjective labor theory it stands to reason does not commit this error.   

Before explaining the real problem, we should get a false problem out of the way.  The fact that the market value is not fully derived from labor-input, i.e. there is a subjective component of value appraised by the consumer, does not defeat Marx’s complaint of exploitation.  The value appropriated by the capitalist is merely the exchange-value already paid by the consumer; the use-value component of the consumer is not a factor between the laborer and the capitalist.  The exchange-value cannot be realized until the price is already attained, in this sense the price is merely the actualization of the mutually agreed upon exchange-value of the buyer and seller.  In order to keep the surplus-value the capitalist must be said to own the product before it is sold, i.e. the capitalist must also be the sole owner and seller of the product, and in order to ensure that there is a surplus-value the capitalist must ensure that the wages of the workers are below the price the commodity will fetch, whatever it will fetch.  What exploitation occurs then, happens prior to the commodity every reaching the market, and is equal exactly to the extent of surplus-value, as Marx claimed.  The subjective aspect of value-determination does not save the capitalist from a Marxist accusation of exploitation.     

The real problem with Marx’s theory is that his explanation is not sufficient to prove the exploitation of the laborers.  This is a result of the subjective component, for Marx’s argument is only sufficient if socialized abstract labor is solely responsible for the total value of a commodity.  Now, I have no doubt that if the laborers are being exploited by capital, the mechanism Marx describes is the one by which it is taking place.  But describing how workers could be exploited is a different thing from proving that they are being exploited.  In order to prove that workers are being exploited–assuming a subjective labor theory in necessary as I have claimed–one would have to show that the individual laborers are fully entitled to the product of their labor; that is that laborers are the sole owners and sellers of the commodities they produce.  

The difficulties this presents are more formidable than Marx understood.  The socialized production system–the form of socialism or communism that Marx recommends–would not necessarily entitle the laborers to the full measure of the exchange-value of their product any more than capitalism would.  If the products are common property or State property, Marx may have merely exchanged potential exploitation by capitalists for potential exploitation by demagogues and bureaucrats.  Socialism and Communism, as Marx understands them, do nothing to protect the laborers–their labor being only an abstract part of the whole–every individual laborer is just as alienated and just as vulnerable.  Without a theory proving that the individual laborers are solely entitled to the full value of their individual or collective productive input, Marx has yet to prove exploitation or provide a bulwark against it for workers.

Part four:  

Marx’s sense of the labor-process is incomplete without his understanding of the role of capital.  To understand capital’s role we need to examine the “self-valorization” appearance of capital.  “[C]apital is money, capital is commodities”, Marx said.  Commodities must possess a useful aspect to have a value, and the use of capital–according to Marx–is Kapitalverwertung or self-valorization.  Self-valorization is the appearance through the process of labor-production and exchange in which capital seems to conjure from itself a profit.  Seen from a particular view-point a certain investment of capital yields a certain amount of return, which is above and beyond the value of the investment itself which is retained or reclaimed.  In concrete terms, the use of capital qua capital is to yield a profit.  To yield a “profit”, the value of the capital invested must itself be maintained.  This is obvious, for if the investment depreciated correspondingly with the return–as David Ricardo believed–the loss of capital would equal the return.  We might benefit by thinking of this as simply selling to the laborers, there would be no return beyond the price of the capital sold to (rather than invested in) the firm.  The process by which capital self-valorizes is mysterious and still heavily debated today by economists.  Marx’s theory reveals self-valorization to be a subterfuge from where the exploitation of labor results in profit, through the ownership of the means of production.

To elucidate this process, we may simply build on Marx’s basic model of exploitation given above.  As the owner’s of the means of production, the capitalists’ lay claim to the products of labor.  The product is sold for more than it cost the capitalist to produce creating a profit.  This profit is appropriated by the capitalists thus valorizing their capital.  Marx maintained that the market value was fixed at the socially minimal amount of labor necessary to produce the product and thus the only way the capitalist could extract a profit would be to pay the laborer’s less than the full amount of value their labor produced.  Economic logic would prove that the more capital investment the more profit, and so the capitalist is likely to invest at least a portion of this profit into more capital.  Thus perpetuating the cycle of capital reinvestment.

Marx recognized that the material use of capital is its ability to save labor, and by so doing increase the productivity of labor and cheapen commodities.  The inherent conflict comes from the tendency–also noted by Ricardo–for wages to drop as a result.  The laborers experience the increase of productivity as a reduction of the value of their labor, while the capitalist experiences the same as an increase in their profits, at least for a time.  The conflicting interests of laborers and capitalists Marx details forms the basis for his belief in class warfare, which is inherent to the capitalist mode of production.

As a condemnation of capitalism, this argument is sufficient; but in order to correct the problem capitalism merely represents, we need to better understand the role of capital in production.  Towards this end, we might assert that the value capital adds to a commodity (or a service or end of any kind) is in the labor it saves through its usage.  This saved labor is necessarily different from the labor involved in the production of the capital itself.  To put this in Marxian terms, we might argue that just as there is a difference between labor and labor power, capital, also, has differing costs and productive value capacities.  A labor cost (the exchange-value of the capital) and a use-value (measurable in labor-saved) work much like labor and labor power; so while the average healthy laborer’s ability to produce value typically exceeds the cost of sustenance necessary to reproduce the laborer’s efforts, well-deployed capital has the ability to produce more labor-savings than the labor costs to produce and maintain it.  History bears this out, since the whole productive increase of the industrial revolution is a testament to this fact.

The value of capital is equal to the reduction of the necessary labor required to meet some end, e.g. produce some thing or benefit from some service–its use-value–minus the labor cost of producing the capital–its exchange-value.  Since, as Marx said, “capital is commodities”, all commodities are also capital; and thus, all commodities share this determination of value.  This definition of value is a serious problem for the rest of Marx’s theories, but a major insight for us: use-values are quantifiable in units of labor-saved and are also necessary factors in the determination of a commodity’s value to a consumer, who must be the ultimate source of all economic evaluations in this theory.  Keep in mind that this determination is necessarily subjective, although it can be plural, it is never communal or social.

Marx’s labor theory, which supposes that the value of a thing consists wholly in the labor that went into its construction, provided a technique for objectively calculating the absolute value of a thing without the need for markets.  If his labor theory were correct, then it would follow that markets could be dispensed with, which is tantamount to saying exchange-value could be independently determined, as long as the quantity of (absolute) use-values, i.e. the material object themselves themselves, comprising the total social need could be determined.  Without any need for market determination, money in such a system loses its function and may also go extinct, taking with it the irrational desire for endless accumulation, or what Marx’s perceived as avarice.  Privatizing property for consumption becomes reducible to what we find useful as a society and nothing more, this would effectively restore natural checks and balances to the economic system while keeping modern production methods in place.  This–I believe–is what Marx had in mind by “scientific socialism”.  From where Marx sat, a society of modestly intelligent people, living and laboring in a particularly communal political arrangement should be able to assess and meet their own needs–as use-values–quite easily; thus the only thing holding back a just and equitable society of such individuals must be the oppressive historical development of capitalist greed; held in place by the tyrannical political force of the monopolists of the means of production, viz. the bourgeoisie.

Scientific utopia, then, wholly depends on just one thing: the ability to derive absolute value from the calculation of socialized abstract labor in a commodity, which I have just shown is not actually possible.  Without it, scientific socialism is an impossibility because we can never determine the true value of things merely by accounting for their production labor.  We need to incorporate use-values, which means, consumers fulfill the role of ultimately deciding for themselves how much a commodity is worth.  Thus, markets and money will prove to be indispensable.

But all is not lost here.  The upshot of capital having a use-value in saving labor is that the labor savings could potentially be made beneficial to the society at large, contingent on a restructuring of the economic order.  Scientific socialism may be dead, but some flavor of socialism may yet prove triumphant.  But to prove it, the real culprit behind economic oppression must first be identified.

To summarize then, Marx’s genius was to identify the mutual exclusivity of interests between capitalists and laborers and to recognize the exploitation of the laborers by the capitalists.  His folly, on the other hand, was to develop a theory of value based entirely on labor that failed to recognized the necessary factor of use-value in total value determinations.  I have attempted to show that use-value is a factor determining the exchange-value of all commodities at market and thus it is not the labor of production alone that determines value and price.  I have also shown how the labor of production or what I call the labor of acquisition reduces the general value of a commodity on the market and so the lower the labor of acquisition, the more valuable the commodity.  Use-values, contra Marx, are in fact quantifiable and serve as the positive value that allows consumers to spend more on a commodity than the labor of acquisition.  Without the labor of acquisition as the sole determinate of value, most of Marx’s subsequent socio-political and economic theories fall apart.  Nevertheless, I insist that capitalism is still exploitative and that the theory that proves it is yet to be addressed.

Afterword:       

I believe that profit, rent, and interest are the real agents of economic oppression in the capitalist system.  As a family of economic behaviors we might call these acts by the collective name of rent.  Essentially, neither private property nor bourgeois greed, but rent that is the source of class conflict and exploitation in capitalism.  Without going into the details, I want to briefly outline the structure of a non-Marxist theory of labor exploitation.  While Marx’s theory based exploitation on positive economic theory, this theory bases it on the political right and social necessity of private property.  In other words, the same theory that provides private property rights to the members of a society condemns rent as a practice just as surely as it condemns thievery.

The justification for a right to private property–according to John Locke–is based on the labor of acquisition and relies on the necessity of individual use and/or consumption.  In other words, without the need to individually consume the property, the labor of acquisition is insufficient to bestow private property legitimation.  The right of the landlord against the tenant farmer to the ownership of the farm land falls on the side of the tenant farmer who actually needs the land.  Those who both need the land and do the work of acquiring it have a rightful claim.  It follows from this that when the need to individually consume is dispensed with, the prior justification for ownership goes with it.  One might only own private property when one both legitimately labored to earn it, and retains some need for it’s exclusive private usage.

So it is that rent, in any form, fails to justify ownership for the renter.  The problem is obvious: when I lease out my object for money I give up my claim to a personal need to exclusively use that object.  My claim then rests only on my legitimate possession of the object through some labor of acquisition.  However, we just saw that this is inadequate.  Further troubling the matter is the claim of the rentee, who does possess the back-ground need necessary to justify exclusive ownership.  But the two aspects cannot be spread across two people, as exclusive rights must in fact be exclusive.  If the property rights are shared between the renter and rentee, then the property in question is by definition common property, and neither party has an exclusive claim to it.  This is all well and good, until a superfluous charge is made by the renter upon the rentee, i.e. the rent itself.  In order to charge this rent, the renter would have to hold exclusive property rights upon the object being lent.  But the act of lending itself simultaneously dissolves these rights.  The actual ownership of the lent object is shared or common and no charge may be made to property the rentee has a fully justified claim too, i.e. the rentee “owns”.

The “use” of renting is not a legitimate use because it is self-defeating.  To lend is to share property rights with another, to charge rent on shared property cannot be legitimated.  And this is where capitalism is exploitative.  Capitalism allows for rent in all its sundry forms.  The most serious problem with capitalism has never been private property or greed or markets or money, but only the family of illegitimate economic procedures we call rent.  Rent allows those with a claim of prior ownership to extort value from the value-generating labor efforts of those who use that capital.  This extortion cannot be legitimated despite the fact that capitalism allows it.  Here then is the source of economic inequality and oppression we find inherent in capitalist countries.

 

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A Non-Marxist Theory of Exploitation: And How to Resolve It

Karl Marx (1818-1883), philosopher and German poli

UNSPECIFIED – CIRCA 1865: Karl Marx (1818-1883), philosopher and German politician. (Photo by Roger Viollet Collection/Getty Images)

Introduction

It’s been a century and a half since Karl Marx published Das Kapital and a century since the Soviet revolution.   I think it’s time to consider class and labor exploitation outside the shadow of Marx’s economic system.  Central to Marx’s social and economic theory was his theory of exploitation.  His theory, in a nutshell, proposed that capital siphons off the value labor produces allowing the owners of the means of production to self-validate their property.  More specifically, the contribution of the owners in providing the means of production was already reflected in the value of the commodity at market.  So, the commodity’s profit was entirely owing to the contribution of labor.  Any profit taken by the owners of the means of production, i.e. the capitalists, was an exploitation of the workers’ labor efforts.  Marx’s entire positive economic theory was an attempt to expose how the system generated exploitation and, assuming Marx’s determinism, would eventually succumb to its own contradictions and give way to scientific communism.

There are many arguments against Marx’s account, but the most notable is lack of capitalism’s demise.  I’m no proponent of determinism, but even if capitalism is determined to fail, the lack of failure despite reoccurring economic collapses, seems to paint a picture of capitalism as a flawed, perhaps even contradictory, system that nevertheless humankind is willing to support and sustain indefinitely.  Contradiction is not enough to overthrow a failing system, a new system must be ready in the wings to takes its place.  Communism itself seems contradictory as it seems to suggest that humans, who may produce and “own” in common, may consume in common as well.  This last is not possible and without it neither is communism.  Private property it seems is here to stay.  The question for this century is how to effect private property without exploitation and without contradiction.

To take a step in that direction, I want to challenge Marx’s account and give an alternative theory of capital’s exploitation of labor.  My alternative is based on the labor theory of private property, like that proposed by John Locke.  If I’m right, the justification establishing private property rights also implies that capitalism, as it is generally understood, is exploitative of labor efforts.  Whereas Marx saw the exploitation of labor as a result of his theory of value–one based exclusively on labor–this theory insists that labor is exploited because the ownership of the means of production is only justified by those doing the labor of producing.  Labor alone justifies ownership and this ownership is necessary to claims of entitlement to profit.  Like Marx’s theory, this theory sees the fractionation and distribution of profits from the sale of commodities as the method that exploits labor.  The theory differs from Marx’s solely as to why the mechanism of exploitation is unjust.

The labor theory of private property is not itself without controversy.  For the sake of expediency, however, I will leave arguments against the labor theory of private property aside for now and simply assume that it is the best available justification for establishing private property rights.  The goal here is not to argue for labor theory but to show that if labor theory is the best justification for private property then capitalism must be exploitative.  Aside from Marxists, we might all agree that private property needs some sort of justification.  As Locke observed, there is no natural justification why this or that thing might be privately owned.  Thus, we seek some social justification to exclude all others from the use of a thing that cannot be consumed except exclusively.   Like Locke, we seek a method for individuating the common world that we might all agree is fair.  The result of this fair method would be a justified scheme of private property ownership.

Labor theory satisfies this method by asserting that by laboring to acquire a thing for the purpose of exclusively consuming it one ought to have the right to fulfill that purpose.  Labor thereby justifies ownership.  Ownership here, it is important to note, is limited to those things one intends on using one’s self.  Without this boundary, labor cannot be applied to anything, and this renders any labor theory of property uncogent, as Robert Nozick has pointed out.  For example, we might say that a crafter who sews bags is entitled to the use of the bag unless they transfer that right by some legitimate method.  They are neither entitled to do whatever they wish with the bag nor is the scope of the bag indeterminable.  What is important here is that labor theory requires a background right, namely the assumption that since one must exclusively use certain goods if one is to use them at all then one must of some means of legitimately gaining exclusivity.  Also important is the fact that the labor theory of property implies that labor has a stronger claim to ownership than mere nominal claims.  In other words, a claim to private property is only as good as the labor claim supporting it.  For example, in the case of the means of production, the mere owners of capital have no labor claims and thus have no legitimate claim to either the means of production or the products that are produced with them.

Before moving on, I wish to be as explicit as possible about what I mean as my labor theory of property.  For the most part, I will follow Locke’s reasoning; however, I am making a few modifications or making explicit what is implicit in Locke.  Firstly, Locke’s theory applies only inside a society and that as such, it is not a universal theory of individual rights, but a theory for individual rights as a need of society.  Civilizations, if they hope to remain stable, must solve the problem of the individual consumption of common world, and this is what the labor theory of property does.  Secondly, I link labor to usage far more explicitly than Locke, although it is both present and essential in Locke’s argument.  Labor acquisition operates only under the assumption of personal use in a labor theory of property.  Thirdly, the link between labor and use is bridged by intention; thus, intentionality serves, in lieu of actual use, to justify exclusive ownership in this labor theory of property.  I acknowledge that these are no minor modifications and that each should be argued for; however, I feel this paper is not the place for those arguments and I hope my reader will grant these assumptions until such time as they may be questioned directly.

Ironically perhaps, this theory is positioned in opposition to both the dominate western economic paradigm, which merely assumes the nominal ownership of the capitalists, as well as the reigning critique of that paradigm, viz. Marxism.  Thus, I have two arguments to make here: (1) that capitalism is exploitative and (2) that it is not for the reasons Marx claimed it is.  Naturally, I will structure what follows in two parts.  The first part is why an economic critique based on Marx’s labor theory of value fails to prove exploitation.  The second part will hopefully show why a theory of exploitation based on a labor theory of property works.

Part 1: Contra Marx

It is no easy task to critique and condemn a thinker whose conclusions one feels to be more or less all correct.  The reason is quite simply that the argument continues to feel right even where it is wrong.  Marx’s folly was not that capitalism is actually just, but that he misidentified how and why capitalism is actually unjust.  Marx rested his critique of capitalism by trying to identify all value with labor, specifically the labor in a commodity.  The labor that went into making the commodity and delivering it into the hands of the consumer is, for Marx, the sole source of all its value.  This is Marx’s labor theory of value.  My critique of Marx begins right here with his positive economics.  I want to show that Marx’s positive economics is missing some key elements, which render value-judgments questionable.  I will argue that labor does provide all the value of the commodities, as Marx claimed, but that labor only has value in concert with use and further that labor-use only bestows value because it justifies a claim to ownership.  In other words, labor provides a value to commodities precisely because it justifies private property rights, or the right to exclusively consume a commodity.

Marx, I fear, got off on the wrong foot and everything went wrong from there.   In the first section of the first chapter of the first volume of Capital, he makes the dubious assumption that use is purely qualitative and so can be summarily dismissed from any further talk of value.  There is nothing like an argument to critique here.  Marx simply assumes use plays no part in value determinations and moves on to what he believes does.  This doesn’t present a problem, Marx thought, since he was only concerned with a commodity’s value on the market and not as it is consumed.  He believes that the price (exchange-value) hovers around what he called the socially-necessary abstract labor required to produce the commodity.  In short, how much human labor time society needs to invest in bringing a commodity to market given current technological capabilities.  Since Marx’s interests in commodities values ends at the moment of acquisition, use-value is indeed superfluous.  But it appears that rather than letting his assumptions imply his theory, Marx let his theory imply his assumptions.  Use-value was an inconvenient truth for political economists, one that Marx had to explain away rather than explain and incorporate into his theory, and he did just that.

Despite Marx’s assumption, use’s relationship to value is just as pivotal as labor’s.  Primarily, use provides the desire for an object in the first place.  Marx too admitted as much, but use is not just qualitative.  We can measure how useful a commodity is or estimate how useful a commodity is likely to be in similar terms of abstract labor that Marx employed.  Only here we’re not speaking of the labor embodied in an object, but the labor saved to us by employing an object at a given task.  For example, we might claim that the use-value of a phone is the labor it saves us from having to travel to speak with someone.  If use-value can be quantified in this way, then Marx’s theory has a gaping hole in it.   This is significant because it adds another value into the equation that results in exchange-value or price.  Now instead of saying exchange-value simply equals the amount of socially necessary abstract labor involved in a commodity’s production, we must fit use-value in somehow.

Marx looked at the situation too closely from the point of view of the producer of commodities and not nearly enough from the point of view of the consumer of commodities.  From the point of view of the producer, the question of value is nebulous, but from the point of view of the consumer it is much more concrete.  The consumer simply estimates the use-value of the object in question relative to themselves, and then subtracts the cost of acquiring it.  This is necessarily an individual estimation, since objects can only be consumed individually.  Interestingly, the cost of acquiring it is the consumers attempt to guess the quantity of socially necessary abstract labor they would have to expend to achieve the acquisition.   In other words, the consumer looks around for the best deal (socially averaged labor cost) and then determines if the commodity will ultimately save them more value in use, if so it is worth buying, if not, then your interests are best served by leaving it on the shelf.  If this sounds a lot like the market place to you, you’re right.  The market determines the price by allowing consumers to weigh use-values against production costs in relations to their needs.  Just determining the costs, as Marx did, is insufficient to determine value.  Value is not socially abstract in the way Marx claimed, that is as an abstraction of production efforts.  Instead value is socially abstract as an averaging of consumer’s demands.

This means that neoclassical positive economics is much closer to the truth than Marx’s.  Neoclassical models adequately describe the actions of values in the volatile market place.  But before western economists break open the champaign, a great irony should be noted: the values these western economic models describe purely quantitatively are in fact units of labor-use.  Neoclassical economics are describing the labor consumers estimate they will save by purchasing a commodity against the labor they must expend to acquire it.  Consumers, and never producers, set the value on all commodities.  These facts are highly problematic for both Marxists and neoclassical economics alike.  Simply put, Marxist economists can’t actually describe how value is generated because Marx’s positive economic model doesn’t take consumer’s needs into consideration, and neoclassical economists can calculate values, but can’t tell you what it is they are calculating because they don’t have a phenomenological model of what value is.  For a normative economic system hoping to be fair, we’re going to need a model that can both calculate value and understand what that value consists of.

Part 2: Exploitation Through Property

The labor theory of property as I have described it reveals exploitation in capitalism that does not rely on value.  Values factor in only afterwards, and reveal only how much exploitation is going on.  The exploitation itself is based on the justifications for the way we come to own property and what rights are conferred as we come to own it.  A need for personal use is the necessary background right for an act of labor to make something exclusively ours.  It is not enough merely to labor, but to labor for something we must use individually for private property rights to be conferred.  As Locke maintained, it is unacceptable to deprive others of that which one has no intention of using in a civilized society.  One is free to claim goods through labor for personal use and even exchange, which is also a form of personal use.  But there are other uses which violate the principle which made the property exclusively yours and this family of special uses is what we must examine to understand the exploitative nature of capitalism.  This family of special uses go by the name of rent and consist of rent, interest, and profit.

To illustrate why rent is problematic we should return to Locke who conceived of the labor theory of property as an argument purporting to show that the tenant farmers were more entitled to the land and produce of that land they worked than the landlords who nominally owned it.  The landlords claim to the land was purely political, often as a grant from the monarch.  This feudal system perpetually kept the tenant farmers in a state of perpetual poverty despite the fact that they worked ceaselessly and at the same time kept their lords, who produced nothing, very wealthy.  Locke, like Marx, recognized this as exploitation and struggled to both explain and condemn it.  While I feel Locke got closer to the truth than Marx, he nevertheless failed to successful eradicate exploitation with his pro-capitalist theory.  Instead, the feudalism against which Locke argued was replaced by a capitalist system, which, while initially radical, grew more and more conservative over time, eventually coming to resemble the feudalism it replaced.  By the time Marx began his critique, capitalism had gone from undermining the landlords’ claim to exclusive ownership to reinforcing their position.  While landlords under feudalism relied on ancestry and royal grants, landlords under capitalism relied on their socially agreed-upon right, through labor, to private property to justify their wealth.

The capitalist’s claim, as it comes to us from Locke, is simply that as the owner of the property they have the right to use that property as they will, including lending or leasing it.  Now no one holds this position absolutely.  For example, no one is going to claim that private property ownership of a handgun gives one the right to use it on anyone you want.  However, rent it could be argued is a much more reasonable use of property; at least that is until we consider what conditions are necessary to grant property to owners in the first place.  As we saw, labor theory asserts that labor and an intention of personal use are both necessary for a legitimate claim to exclusion.  Even if we assume that an owner justly acquired their property through labor, the moment the intention to personally use that property is removed, the legitimacy of their claim falls away.  They simply no longer meet the prior condition.  By definition, there cannot be an intention of personal use in the act of renting.

The use of rent does not require exclusivity.  Rent requires a dual use, as an object of rent is only rentable when someone else has a need to use it exclusively but cannot acquire it themselves.  During rent the object is released to the person with a need for exclusive use of it, but the nominal ownership is retained.  Thus, with rent a second use is created for private property beyond the one that requires exclusive use.  The problem of rent can be seen as making what is private, common again.  When the property is shared it cannot by definition be private.  What we end up with is two individuals, each with a partial claim to the same property: the renter and the rentee.  The renter has a claim to ownership through the labor of acquisition to the object, but at the point of lending the object for rent, the renter lacks a need for exclusive use.  The rentee has the right through the need and intention of exclusive use, but when renting lacks the labor of acquisition to legitimately possession of the object.  This seeming impasse is not insurmountable however.  The right granting power of labor, it must be recalled, rests on wholly on the background right for the need for exclusive use.   The rentee, it seems, ultimately has the stronger claim.

Before moving on, let us consider a few objections.  First, we might ask, but what of lending without charge?  If renting is a problem, wouldn’t lending be a problem too?  The short answer is no, lending is not a problem because there is not a second use in play with lending.  The ownership may remain with the lender because the lender is not able to use the object while it is being lent.  It is the dual use of “private” property that defeats its own justification.

Second, rent, our capitalist friends might suggest, is not the same thing as profit.  In some ways this is true, but as far as what is at stake here, it is not.  The question for the laborer and the capitalist is merely a question of who owns the product at the end of the production line.  The laborer has the need to the means of production to produce, just as the owner of the means of production requires labor to produce.  Just like the rented object we can see that labor has the stronger claim to ownership under a labor theory of property.  So it is that under a labor theory of property ownership of the product is legitimately labor’s to use or sell.  In fact, the claim to the ownership of the means of production is most legitimately that of the laborers.  Under a fair economic system then, all businesses should actually be owned by the workers and not by capitalist investors.  This is just like saying, as Locke did, that farms ought to be owned by the farmers and not the landlords.  The landlord–or capitalist as it may be–should be incentivized to sell the land they are not using themselves by disallowing a profit to be generated from it.  As with the land, the same holds true of the means of production.

Finally, what about incentives?  What incentive can there be for lending, which we might readily admit is useful and necessary to an economy, without rent, interest, or profit?  Incentives don’t really change.  What changes are how those incentives get expressed.  People will still have reasons to lend, just not to make more money.  In fact, the incentive to make more money is at the root of much of the world’s sorrows.  The unending desire for more, that is the ethos of capitalism is an evil that pits all against all in perpetual economic warfare.  But that is the structure of the system, not the incentive to acquire, nor the incentive to be economically secure and comfortable.  Everyone might want infinitely more money, but barred for the uses of rent, interest, and profit, they’ll have to labor for every cent they make.  My hunch is that this will create a disincentive to acquiring more and more wealth.  Without the endless desire to accumulate, resources can be distributed more equally both inside society and between societies.  Without the fierce competition for resources, we might slow down our mad rush to strip the Earth and foul our nest.  We might all breathe a little easier, live a little better, and smile at one another.  The goods of economic peace to too great to be counted, and that is the only incentive we ought to be concerned with.

To reiterate, the goal of an economic system based on private property must be to get the property that needs to be used exclusively into the hands of those who need to use it, i.e., to make it their exclusive property.  Measuring capitalism by that standard we can see that capitalism fails because it does not distribute private property to those who are most entitled to it, that is those who are going to actually, physically use it.  The fact that capitalism allows for rent sets it at odds with the economic advantages of a system based on private property.  Make no mistake, I am forcing capitalists into a rather unpalatable dilemma with this argument.  Either private property is justifiable or rent (and profit and interest) are justifiable, but not both, and capitalism as it currently defined requires both.  Rent, obviously, requires private property, but we might have a private property based system that does not permit rent.  But the capitalist, who lives by rent or interest or profit, as opposed to labor, is necessarily eliminated from economic consideration.  With the capitalist, goes capitalism as we know it.  What is left is a private property based economic system that deals in free markets, utilizes money, and places ownership of the means of production squarely in the hands of those who will use it best, the workers.  Surely such a system is not capitalist, but neither could it be considered communist or even particularly socialist.  Whatever name history chooses for it, let us have it.

There are many pragmatic problems to overcome in implementing such a system, but these problems are neither innumerable nor insurmountable.  Such as system is not only feasible it is efficient.  It is more efficient than the perpetual cycles of boom and bust, of welfare and austerity, of liberalism and conservatism that cost millions of dollars and hours, every time we have to stop and reverse direction.  This simple system will go farther to end economic exploitation with less effort, and at the same time achieve a fair and balanced economic situation that is at the same time more stable and more flexible than either capitalism or communism or any hybrid could possibly hope to be.

 

 

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An Ode to a Snowflake

In the crowded market place, the loud speaker screams with a straight face.

“This is the way the world is…”

“This is the way the world is…”

“This is the way the world is, a real hell for the idealist!”

In the corner, crowned by fate, the idealist smiles while she waits.

“This is the way the world is…”

“This is the way the world is…”

“This is the way the world is…”

a paradise unrealized.

The loud speaker screams, “Won’t you please believe it!?!”

 

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The Emerging Universe

There is a debate in philosophy and science about whether or not the universe can fully be known.  The debate centers on the conflicting ideas of reductionism and emergentism.  Reductionism is the belief that all phenomena reduce to physics (or possibly mathematics) and so at some point we might know the universe entirely because we would have all the variables and all the formulas necessary to describe all phenomena.  For example, we could predict stock market fluctuations because we could reduce them to human psychology, which we could reduce to physical biology, which itself would reduce to neuro-chemistry, which again reduces to physics, which we can describe quantifiably.  Emergentism on the other hand holds that there are gaps in the chain of reductions that cannot be filled.  In other words, some new properties simply emerge without any seeming correspondence to the system upon which it is built.

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Locke, Marx, and Two Theories of Labor

Back in April I won the Next System Project’s essay contest for a graduate essay attempting to reimagine our economic structure.  Below is the link to my essay on published on their site.

1stPlaceGraduate-1024x500

Locke, Marx, and Two Theories of Labor

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Things Fall Apart

William Butler Yeats’ poem “The Second Coming” should scare the shit out of anyone with half a brain and more than a speck of heart.   It certainly always scared me.  The thought of the end of the world, the falling of civilization, the cracking of doom filling the air.  Revolution it is called by some, civil war by others.  It all sounds pretty horrible, and Yeats captures the horror in twenty-two short lines.


The Second Coming by W. B. Yeats

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

Surely some revelation is at hand;
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi
Troubles my sight: somewhere in sands of the desert
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.
The darkness drops again; but now I know
That twenty centuries of stony sleep
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?


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